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
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
OFFICE OF POLITICAL RESEARCH

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TURKISH CYPRUS IN 1976: ECONOMIC, DEMOGRAPHIC AND POLITICAL DIMENSIONS



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NOTE: The author prepared this study while serving as a summer intern in the Office of Political Research. Other offices were consulted and their comments were appreciated and used. Comments on the paper will be welcomed 

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NOTE

Within the sphere of Greco-Turkish rivalry and tension, the problem of Cyprus remains a major issue that defies easy solution. In the wake of the ill-fated Greek coup against Archbishop Makarios III in July 1974, Turkish military forces intervened in order to impose their own answer: the de facto partition of the small island into two separate communities. The purpose of this study is to present an assessment of northern Cyprus under the Turks, its economic, demographic and political conditions.

Research for this paper was considerably hampered by frequent unavailability of even basic information. This paucity is principally a reflection of limited US access to that portion of Cyprus and the reluctance of mainland and Cypriot Turks to divulge information to the world. We may even conjecture that the authorities themselves do not possess many accurate statistics because of the still considerable disarray in the north of Cyprus.


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I. THE BACKGROUND

When the Turkish invasion force landed in Cyprus on 20 July 1974, it served as an effective catalyst in bringing about a de facto partition of two major ethnic communities that had grown increasingly intolerant and distrustful of each other. Out of the social and economic chaos that accompanied the military intervention, two separate political entities emerged. The Greek Cypriot government under Archbishop Makarios III is still recognized internationally as the sole representative of a united and independent Cyprus. The Turkish Cypriots, determined to build and regulate their own society and economy, on 13 February 1975, unilaterally proclaimed the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus (TFSC-Kibris Turk Federe Devleti).

While the history of Turkish-Greek rivalry on Cyprus is not central to the theme of this paper, it does provide a useful setting for appreciating the major premise of the paper: that the TFSC will not surrender its social or economic integrity to any island-wide administration nor accept any central political controls that compromise Turkish Cypriot communal independence.

Greek and Turkish Cypriot relations go back to 1571 when Ottoman forces captured the island and colonized it with around 20,000 soldiers. When the central administration of the sprawling Ottoman Empire was strong, the Greek Cypriots were reasonably assured of a secure position and their "Greekness" was preserved by virtue of an autocephalous Greek Orthodox archbishop. The disintegration and deterioration of authority in Istanbul, however, allowed control of the island to fall into the hands of rapacious governors and officials whose misconduct exacerbated tension between the two predominant ethnic communities on the island.

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In the wake of the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-78, the Sublime Porte was persuaded to relinquish control of the troublesome island to the British in exchange for promises of support against Russia. While British rule in Cyprus was characteristically fair and provided some significant improvements on the island, the colonial officers were incapable of quelling demands for Enosis (Union with Greece) by the Greek Cypriots and the growing antagonism between the ethnic communities. In the early 1950s, militant proponents of Enosis formed the guerrilla group EOKA under the leadership of George Grivas, and engaged in an active campaign of harassing British authorities.

By 1959, the British resolve to control Cyprus as a crown colony was gone and in that year agreements among Britain, Greece and Turkey were signed in London and Zurich leading to an independent republic of Cyprus in 1960. Enosis was renounced but the island was free and the Turkish minority received an extraordinary share of political authority.* The absence of the strong moderating hand of the British, however, allowed fears and ambitions of both Greek and Turkish Cypriots to be aggravated, each side now supported by its respective "homeland." Brooding collectively over their enforced proximity, both communities in Cyprus displayed an almost total inability to comprehend the fears on the "other side."

* According to the 1960 constitution, for example, the president of the republic had to be Greek and the vice-presidency was reserved for a Turk. In most areas of government administration, a "70-30 per centum" principle was applied; i.e., 70 percent of a national body or service had to be Greek and 30 percent Turkish. The actual nationality ratio was closer to 80 percent-20 percent. For discussion of the Cypriot constitution, see Stanley Kyriakides, Cyprus: Constitutionalism and Crisis Government (Philadelphia, 1968). Since December 1963, Turkish Cypriot political leaders have not actively participated in the Cypriot national government.

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The intercommunal battles of 1963-64 and 1967 were clear signs that the citizens of the Cypriot republic did not accept the status quo. Assigning administrative positions upon the basis of ethnic origin only served to intensify communal rivalry. Both communities had become firmly entrenched in positions that were essentially irreconcilable and reinforced by separate arguments that were painfully logical and persuasive. For the Greeks, the issue was quite simple; they represented the vast majority of Cyprus' population and the principles of democracy necessitated that the Turkish Cypriots accept their role as a minority. Their refusal to do so, accompanied by demands for a disproportionate voice in civil and military affairs, was the factor that denied Cyprus its traditional serenity. The Turks, on the other hand, vigorously contended that the Greeks were bent upon obliterating their culture and keeping them impoverished second class citizens. Furthermore, in their estimation, the Greeks were cunning and faithless, willing to mouth any lie if it advanced them along the byzantine path to Enosis. That the situation was heading towards a complete breakdown was clear. The only question was of when it would occur. The Cypriot republic was buried in July 1974 when the Greek Colonels "masterminded" a coup against Archbishop Makarios III. The ineptness of the plotters and the resulting confusion gave the Turkish government of Bulent Ecevit a justification for invading and occupying almost 40 percent of Cyprus.

Since the conclusion of that operation (code-named "Attila"),* northern Cyprus has become very nearly a closed society, at least

* The choice of the code-name "Attila" for the Turkish intervention operation provides an interesting insight into one aspect of contemporary Turkish psychology. First, there is a growing trend among modern Turks to delve into and identify with their pre-Islamic heritage; i.e., the 'pure' Turkic traditions. Second, although Attila enjoys a rather unsavory reputation in the West ("The Scourge of God," etc.) his martial prowess and strength are qualities admired by a very large sector of Turks.

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in terms of efforts to assess social and economic conditions. We are, to be blunt, reduced to offering a statement of problems with regard to the Turkish-controlled sector of Cyprus.

II. POPULATION CHANGES IN THE NORTH

A. The Exodus of Greek Cypriots

Prior to the July 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus, approximately 160,000 Greek Cypriots inhabited the sector now under Turkish control. Today, the Greek population has dwindled to around 6,000 and is continuing to decrease at an average rate of nearly 400 per month. The vast majority of the Greek Cypriot refugees fled during the Turkish invasion, and since the cessation of hostilities the Turkish Cypriots have displayed virtually no interest in permitting these individuals to return to their former homes. Concomitantly, those few Greek Cypriots who at first refused to flee their homes have been subjected to steady harassment and were urged to move to the south of Cyprus. Not unnaturally, a goodly number of these Cypriots, finding themselves a small minority within a hostile environment, do not require much encouragement to migrate. Greek churches and cemeteries have become occasional targets of extensive and malicious desecration, in part popular retribution for real or imagined Greek excesses of 1963-64, 1967 and 1974.* There have also been isolated reports of Greek Cypriots simply being thrown out of their homes and even shot if they resisted, although it would seem that Turkish authorities prefer the Greeks to leave of their own volition. It is reasonable to assume that if

* In 1963-64, both sides exchanged accusations of atrocities and massacres, many of which were ill-founded or designed for propaganda purposes. It does appear, however that both at this time and in 1967, the Turkish Cypriot civilians suffered far more severely than did the Greeks. Rauf Denktash, leader of the TFSC, recently asserted that since 1963, over 100 were destroyed or damaged by the Greeks. This appears to be an exaggeration, although even today there are ruins of Turkish villages destroyed in 1963 and 1967.

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the current conditions and attitudes continue, within the next two years the Turkish-held portion of Cyprus will be almost completely free of Greek Cypriots.

As the Greek enclave within northern Cyprus erodes steadily, the Turkish population there grows, albeit in a haphazard fashion. The size of the Turkish element within Cyprus is naturally a crucial factor with regard to future negotiations determining the size of any possible Turkish Cypriot zone. Each side in the dispute has played fast and loose with this particular statistic, with the official Turkish position claiming that in 1975 there were around 160,000 Turkish Cypriots on the island. The Makarios government contends that there were only 106,000. According to the 1960 census, there were around 105,000 Turkish Cypriots, an increase of 30 percent since the previous census of 1946.* This would suggest that in the next 14 years after 1960, the natural increase

* There have been a variety of intriguing features in the respective growth patterns of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, with the former usually demonstrating a greater natural increase than the latter. For example, from 1891 to 1901, the Turkish Cypriot community increased by 7.05 percent whereas the Greeks expanded by 15.09 percent. In the decade between 1921 and 1931, the Greeks grew by 13.77 percent and the Turks only by 4.73 percent, although part of this surprisingly low rate of growth can be explained by the significant emigration of Turks to Anatolia between 1924 and 1926, presumably to become citizens of the nascent Turkish republic. All in all, between 1881 and 1946, the Greek Cypriot community increased by 163 percent and the Turks by around 77 percent. The cause of this disparity was not one of fertility or (we assume) congress, but because of the great infant mortality rate among the Turks and their shorter life expectancy. Since 1946, however, the Turkish Cypriot community has displayed more vitality than the Greeks, increasing 30.9 percent versus 22.3 percent up through 1960, probably owing to improved medical care.

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within the Turkish community would amount to around 32,000 individuals, thereby implying the 1974 Turkish population to be 137,000. This figure cannot be considered precise, however, because of the flight of Turkish Cypriots in 1963-64 and 1967 and the refusal of Turkish Cypriot authorities since 1964 to provide complete vital statistics to the government in Nicosia. An additional problem is that both Greek and Turkish officials kept very inaccurate records on the emigration of Cypriots. Hence, the most reasonable estimate for the present Turkish Cypriot population in 1976 is 90,000 to 100,000 but this cannot be verified.*

B. The Influx of Non-Cypriot Turks

The indigenous population of the Turks has been considerably augmented both by the presence of Turkish military personnel and immigrants from Anatolia. There are around 25,000 regular Turkish troops remaining in Cyprus. Veterans of the 1974 campaign and their dependents have been granted by the TFSC the right to become naturalized Cypriot citizens, but there is no clear information about how many troops have taken advantage of this opportunity.

* This approximation is based upon an extrapolation using the number of voters in the June 1976 Turkish Cypriot elections and the demographic features of Cyprus in preceding years. In the TFSC general elections, slightly under 54,000 ballots were cast, the voting pool consisting of all individuals 18 years of age or older. Approximately 60 percent of the Cypriot population fits into this age bracket, a figure which indicates that the entire Turkish Cypriot population amounts to at least 90,000. Obviously, a crucial factor in this equation is the percentage of Turkish Cypriot voters who visited the polls as compared to the number of those eligible, a figure which is not available. Given the general excitement of the first general election in the TFSC, it seems certain that at least 90 per cent of the electorate participated which means that there would be around 60,000 qualified voters. Turning again to the process used above, this number allows us to calculate the population of the TFSC as numbering 100,000 at most.

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The most dramatic and controversial aspect of the demographic change in Cyprus has been the influx of Turks from Anatolia. Greek Cypriot sources have asserted that so far, 50,000 Turks from Asia Minor have migrated and settled within northern Cyprus, occupying Greek Cypriot dwellings in the process. More realistic estimates, however, suggest that the figure is closer to 20,000. There is a serious problem in categorizing these newly-arrived Turks; i.e., what percentage are returning Turkish Cypriot refugees and how many are latter-day colonizers from the Turkish mainland or just temporary workers, especially from the coastal provinces?*

Those Turks who are in fact Cypriot in origin will probably not encounter too much difficulty in blending into the social and economic environment of Cyprus. Peasants from Anatolia, on the other hand, cannot expect to find an equally satisfactory situation. Turkish Cypriots tend to be considerably more sophisticated than their Anatolian counterparts whose habits and customs are basically the same as those of a millenium ago.

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There are other significant facets to the ongoing relationship between island and mainland Turks. Administrators and technicians sent by Ankara to put northern Cyprus back on its feet have experienced considerable difficulty. Although the Turkish Cypriots are usually more skilled than the average peasant imported from Turkey, they nevertheless suffer from a severe lack of managerial and entrepreneurial training, the

* The use of immigrants from the Anatolian coastal areas is very logical, insofar as such individuals and families would, presumably, be more adaptable to the economic and geographic conditions within Cyprus. There have been occasional references to the Laz Turks of the Black Sea area who have been, historically, more familiar with citrus crops and maritime activities.

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result of long years of Greek domination and suppression. The Ankara technocrat faces an exasperating and frustrating challenge that invites irritation on the part of his intended beneficiary. While genuinely grateful for the support of Turkey, some Turkish Cypriots resent the condescending manner of their brethren and their "you should be grateful to us" attitude. As suggested above, such friction presents no serious immediate problem but as the Turkish sector grows more secure, this tension is likely to surface.

III. POLITICAL ASPECTS OF NORTHERN CYPRUS

A. TFSC Administration

The current political administration of northern Cyprus appears to follow the form stipulated in the 1960 Cypriot constitution. The civilian administration consists of a president, prime minister, council of ministers and a forty-man constituent assembly elected by direct popular vote. Although the Turkish Cypriot constitution as proclaimed in May 1976 is somewhat vague as to the duties of the president, it is nevertheless clear that he is the center of civilian authority within the state, with the prime minister functioning in a secondary role, although this situation also depends upon personalities. The 20 June 1976 elections made it abundantly clear that Rauf Denktash enjoys massive popular support, winning almost 80 percent of the votes. His party, the National Unity Party, did not fare quite so well but still succeeded in securing 30 seats within the constituent assembly, thereby giving Denktash substantial authority.

As the principal political figure within the Turkish Cypriot community, Denktash enjoys a long record of serving the needs of his compatriots. Aggressive yet also a good tactician, he has been characterized as a "bull on figure skates" in his continual battle for the independence of the Turkish Cypriots. His extremely personal and hard-working approach has won him a large and devoted following. His only serious opposition is Dr. Fazil Kucuk, a former leader of the Turkish community and founder of the newspaper Halkin Sesi (Voice of the People).

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The Council of Ministers named by Denktash can be characterized as young*, inexperienced and loyal to the President. They have received a warm but not particularly enthusiastic reception in the Turkish Cypriot press, which expressed some concern over their age and ability. On the other hand, youth and stamina are essential ingredients for this fledgling republic if it is to survive.

B. Turkish Cypriot Relations with Turkey

Both the mainland Turkish military command and Ankara wield considerable influence over Cypriot policy but the exact nature of their power is difficult to assay. The Turkish embassy in Nicosia is the principal conduit through which vital funds from Ankara are channeled to the Denktash administration and is thereby in a strong position to exert pressure upon its political actions. Their willingness to employ this leverage, however, is tempered by a desire to maintain tranquility within the Turkish Cypriot community. The role of the Turkish military commanders on Cyprus has also apparently been reduced, owing to the declining likelihood of renewed military activity.

If the growing ability of Denktash to act independently of Ankara is in part the result of his overwhelming support within northern Cyprus, then it is also the direct consequence of Turkish internal politics and realities. Turkish policy with regard to Cyprus (or, more accurately, the general lack of it) makes sense only when we put ourselves into the shoes of Turkish Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel. In order for such a scenario to become meaningful, two points must be understood:

1. The mainland Turks have a very genuine and sincere interest in the welfare of the Turkish Cypriots who are viewed as 'outer Turks' (dis Turkler). Their kinship is acknowledged in frequently romantic nationalistic terms that, not surprisingly, are oftentimes tarnished when the two parties make contact with one another. Nevertheless, their mutual feelings of ethnic bonds are extremely strong and the bloodshed of 1974 added yet another tangible justification for strengthening their ties.

* The average age of the ministers is 41, the oldest being 50 and the youngest 30.

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All too often, as one proverb has it, the Turks are willing to "burn the blanket in order to kill the fleas." Convinced by both history and world opinion, the Turks believe that they are utterly alone in the international scene and cannot trust anyone else. The overwhelming condemnation by the UN of Turkish actions in Cyprus was judged by many Turks as proof of their isolation.

These factors underscore Demirel's difficulty in bringing about progress in the Cyprus negotiations. Demirel publicly declares his commitment to a bi-zonal federation on Cyprus with a weak central administration. While such a proposition is far removed from the status quo ante bellum, he nevertheless feels that this move would create greater international respect for Turkey and thus alleviate its relative isolation. This approach, however, is sharply criticized by some members of his coalition, most notably Deputy Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan, [REDACTED] leader of the National Salvation Party.

Demirel's ability to maintain a majority in the Grand National Assembly has been consistent but the margins are always very narrow with a delicate balance. The adroit political maneuvering that is essential to preserve his four-party coalition does not permit Demirel to display the moderation and generosity required to speed up the Cyprus discussions since any truly conciliatory gestures would provoke the wrath of his political partners and bring about the fall of his administration. Thus, it is clearly to his advantage to sit and do little about Cyprus, a policy by default that will continue as long as Demirel is preoccupied with holding his government together.

If, then, we fault Demirel to some measure for the continuing deadlock on Cyprus, we still cannot assume that a change in administration, presumably in favor of Republican People's Party (RPP) chief Bulent Ecevit, would automatically bring about any significant changes concerning Cyprus because he too would probably be forced to form a coalition government. Within the last two years, there has been a growing trend within Turkey away from the extremist parties (both leftist and

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rightist) resulting in the strengthening of the two principal parties, the Justice Party (JP) and the RPP. This movement does not clearly work to the advantage of either party, however, and the role of the very small parties remains every bit as crucial as before. The JP and RPP are too evenly matched now in terms of popular support for either side to claim an unqualified majority in the Grand National Assembly. This provides the fringe groups with broker-power completely out of proportion with their real strength.

There is still another possibility that induces Demirel to hold tight on Cyprus in order to preserve power; namely, it is by no means certain that Ecevit could forge a viable coalition to replace that of Demirel. Such a failure could leave Turkey without a government and perhaps force the military to intervene for the sake of maintaining public order, an unpleasant prospect for all the political parties.

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IV. ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

Meaningful data on the economic status of northern Cyprus are as scanty as indicators of social conditions. A recent US senatorial staff report bluntly stated, "There are no real economic indicators for the North (sic). Statistics are few and where available are usually unreliable."* Indeed, we are compelled to rely upon the meagre data that either the Turkish Cypriots or mainlanders are willing to disclose for their own purposes.

* Crisis on Cyprus. 1976: Crucial Year for Peace. A Staff Report prepared for the use of the subcommittee to investigate problems connected with refugees and escapees for the committee on the judiciary. United States Senate, 94th Congress, second session. January 19, 1976, p.64.

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Although the amount of land actually controlled by Turkish forces is around 38 percent of Cyprus, in economic terms this area represents well over one-half of the island's pre-1974 wealth. The vast preponderance of the economic activity had been, of course, in the hands of the Greek Cypriots, and with their departure since mid-1974, technical and managerial skill also vanished, thus leaving northern Cyprus debilitated and still suffering from the destruction caused by the invasion.

Any attempt to gauge the relative economic success or failure of northern Cyprus is hampered by the general lack of pre-1974 indicators for the productive capabilities of the portion currently controlled by the Turkish Cypriot "government." The Turkish forces occupy only one administrative district in toto, the rest of their holdings being comprised of portions of other districts. Since most agricultural and industrial statistics are broken down only in terms of district production, it is all but impossible to ascertain, for example, the actual value of a given percentage of a district. In other words, it is a tedious task to compare or contrast precisely how well the Turkish Cypriots are making use of the land vis-a-vis the Greek Cypriot experience in the area.

In the second half of 1974, the Cypriot Turks and military forces were far too preoccupied with maintaining a semblance of order and settling Turkish Cypriot refugees to pay adequate attention to the economy of the newly-conquered area. Economic enterprises including small-scale industries, agriculture and the highly-lucrative tourist industry virtually came to a halt. In 1975, however, significant if haphazard progress was made in reconstructing the economic life of northern Cyprus, especially in the field of tourism where the physical effects of war were minimal. Of the 58,000 overnight tourists who visited Turkish-held Cyprus, approximately 90 percent were from the Turkish mainland, the rest being presumably Europeans or those carrying British Commonwealth passports. These visitors spent around \$22 million of which 20 percent was in foreign currency. Both mainland and Cypriot Turks see potential profit in developing the tourist business. Turkish Cypriot authorities are hoping to lure some 90,000 tourists to the island in 1976, a figure that is probably too optimistic. Nevertheless, barring an outbreak of hostilities, and assuming a resumption of normal

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patterns of life in the North, more tourists will seek the natural pleasures of the island, leaving behind their liras, pounds, dollars and marks.

In the area of foreign trade, Turkish Cyprus has not exhibited the same vigor as shown with regard to tourism. During all of 1975, exports totaled approximately \$10 million with 40 percent of the goods, mostly citrus produce, received by Turkey.* Imports, 65 percent of which came from Turkey, were valued at over \$30 million thus leaving the Turkish Cypriots with a trade deficit of \$20 million. Thus far, we should also note, the Turkish Cypriots have not encountered any overwhelming difficulty in locating markets for their goods. The Turkish Cypriots project exports for 1976 will amount to about \$26 million, anticipating a large increase in agricultural output. Imports are expected to amount to \$48 million consisting mostly of finished industrial items and certain foods, notably cereals.

The Turkish Cypriots have experienced their greatest difficulty in attempting to revive the industrial sector. In 1974 there were 230 industrial facilities in northern Cyprus of which less than 50 are currently operating. Part of the explanation for this slow recovery is certainly due to war-related damage in 1974, both deliberate and accidental. The greatest challenge, however, is in locating and training personnel to man these factories. Mainland and Cypriot Turks have cooperated in this venture but have had little success in any but the smallest plants. It will probably require three to five years for

* By way of comparison, under the Greek Cypriots southern Cyprus recorded export sales for 1975 valued at \$135 million, a staggering achievement that bears testimony to the resilience and ability of the Greek Cypriots. Part of this recovery is also due to the fact that the government of Makarios is still recognized internationally as the sole legitimate government in Cyprus and is thus better able to attract vital international loans. Also, the Greek Cypriots have better access to foreign markets than their Turkish rivals.

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northern Cyprus to achieve its pre-1974 industrial output, given the present trends.

For the average Turkish Cypriot there have been some serious problems such as double-digit inflation, vegetable shortages, and an overall lack of numerous small-industry items (e.g., shoes, clothing). The frustration generated by these conditions is, however, countered by a greater sense of security and a pragmatic understanding of the difficulty of rebuilding an economy and locating markets. Unemployment is also a looming problem, prompted by the influx of refugees and the release of military personnel from active duty. The situation is not caused by a lack of job opportunities but, rather, the unsuitability of the current workforce for the openings available, particularly in the industrial and professional spheres.

There have been a few other internal developments that clearly underscore the intention of the Turkish Cypriots and their patrons to settle permanently in their northern enclave. Electrical facilities, fuel depots, new roads and airfields are being constructed on a modest scale yet they signal the aim of the Turkish Cypriots towards total independence from southern Cyprus.

One last sign of how Turkish Cypriot officials view the current year in economic terms is the projected budget for northern Cyprus. This budget, as approved by the Turkish Cypriot constituent assembly, breaks down as follows:*

<u>Income</u>	(TL16 = US\$1)
Local revenues and domestic loans:	TL676 million (US\$42 million)
Aid from Republic of Turkey :	TL450 million (US\$28 million)
Total :	TL1,126 million (US\$70 million)

* FBIS, Western Europe, Vol. VII (May 19, 1976), R6.

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Expenditures

Investment expenditures:	TL262 million (US\$16 million)
Current expenditures :	TL864 million (US\$54 million)
Total :	TL1,126 million (US\$70 million)

The probability that the Turkish Cypriots will be able to achieve a balanced budget is quite low. While they are assured of receiving almost 50 percent of their revenue from Turkey, they are likely to encounter problems in tax collecting. Import duties, for example, formerly represented the largest single source of government income on the island. In an effort to alleviate shortages and inflation of some foodstuffs duties have been removed on food items imported from Turkey, thereby reducing cost and increasing availability to the consumer. On the other hand, this practice robs the government of a considerable source of income. The Turkish government will probably be willing to absorb part of any major deficit but is constrained by its own unfavorable economic situation.

V. GENERAL PROSPECTS

Since there is little reason to expect that the status quo between the two communities in Cyprus will change significantly within the near future, we may argue as follows. With regard to social integration and development in northern Cyprus, four relatively distinct groups are involved: resident Turkish Cypriots, returning Turkish Cypriot refugees, military and administrative personnel from Turkey and the mainland peasants migrating to Cyprus. Among the first three groups, there will be few long-term problems in social interaction and cooperation. There will probably be traces of rural versus urban rivalry as well as mainland/island interethnic tensions but these factors are not likely to pose any insurmountable block to an integrated society in northern Cyprus. All three of these groups, however, will be suspicious, if not overtly hostile, toward any major influx of Anatolian peasants, individuals socially and culturally alien both to Turkish Cypriots and urban mainland Turks. The growth

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of mutual antagonism may, in fact, reach the point where restrictions may be placed upon their migration to Cyprus. On the whole, however, Turkish Cypriot society will continue to display remarkable unity spawned both by a perception of Greek animosity and a generally stoic outlook towards the world around them.

In the economic sphere, there is every indication that despite an uneven economy and a generally depressed standard of living, the Turkish Cypriots are absolutely determined to create a viable state. Given their resources, support from Turkey and sheer endurance, there is also no doubt that they will succeed in doing so despite severe hardships. Tourism and agriculture are making good progress and if the industrial sector is lagging far behind, it will nevertheless be close to adequate for local consumption. While northern Cyprus may never be truly prosperous, the economic output will be sufficient to meet the modest expectations of the Cypriot Turks.

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